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In the context of the likely acces-sion of China to the World TradeOrganization (WTO), it is useful to
gauge the protection or taxation
affecting the production of China’s
major agricultural crops and to assess
the competitiveness of these crops.
Because Chinese agriculture differs by
regions, we consider early indica rice,
late indica rice, and japonica rice
grown in different parts of China,
south wheat, north wheat, south corn,
north corn, sorghum, soybeans,
rapeseed, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane,
and a subset of fruits and vegetables.
We use 1996 to 1998 data, which are
the most recent available data.
DISTORTIONS IN CHINESE
AGRICULTURE
China’s rapid economic growth and
gradual transition toward a market
economy have brought about signifi-
cant changes in production and
consumption patterns and trade
behavior in agriculture. To a consider-
able extent, however, the government,
still distorts and controls input
supply, output procurement, and
trade flows, especially in the grain
sector. China’s leaders, as in many
Asian countries, have been defining
food security as grain security, thus
bringing on policymakers’ active
interference in grain and oilseed
markets and trade, effectively closing
their borders beyond preset import
quotas levels. Despite the substantial
rural and economic reforms toward
free domestic markets, which have
occurred since 1978, there is still a
high degree of state intervention in
Chinese agriculture. Cropping pat-
terns are still partly determined by
nonmarket influences such as the
state purchase contracts and the
associated input distribution systems.
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The effective protection coeffi-
cient (EPC) is a ratio of value-added
of a sector in distorted prices (i.e.,
the prices paid and received by
growers) to its value-added in world
prices. This coefficient indicates the
degree of policy transfer arising with
output and tradable input policy
distortions. An EPC greater than one
indicates that the sector receives a
“net” subsidy for its activities.
Conversely, if the EPC is less than
one, it indicates that the sector is
penalized by a net taxation when
both tradable input and output
distortions are accounted
for.
The values of the EPC
reported in Table 1 show
that there is a big differ-
ence in the degree of
policy transfer across
commodities. Corn,
sugarcane, and sorghum
enjoy a heavy support on
three-year average (1996
to 1998) of 32, 10, and 36
percent, respectively, for
their value-added,
whereas japonica rice,
late indica rice, and leaf
tobacco face a net tax of
49, 21, and 17 percent, respectively,
on average on their value-added.
Looking at input and output
distortions separately reveals that
agricultural protection in China is
still reminiscent of the import-
substitution era and shows system-
atic patterns of input subsidization
and output taxation through foreign
exchange rationing and overvalued
currency.
COMPETITIVENESS
A common indicator of competitive-
ness is the domestic resource cost
(DRC), which indicates how much
foreign exchange is saved by produc-
ing a good domestically instead of
importing it. A DRC of less than one
indicates that the country is competi-
tive at producing the good; con-
versely, a DRC greater than one
indicates the lack of competitive-
ness—it is cheaper to import the
good than to produce it.
The DRC indicator for various
crops is shown in Table 2 and leads
to the same conclusions as the
protection indicator. Protection goes
to crops that are not competitive.
The DRC values for competitive
activities such japonica rice, cab-
bage, green beans, tobacco, cotton,
apples, and oranges are less than or
close to one and clearly are smaller
than those for most grains, oilseeds,
and sugarcane. Most oilseeds and
grain crops are protected and
produced inefficiently in China, with
the DRC value greater than one, with
the notable exception of japonica
rice. The results show that govern-
ment policies on grain self-suffi-
ciency lead to inefficient allocation
of resources in Chinese agriculture
and that there are significant differ-
ences in DRC values between the
different types of rice, wheat, and
corn. Japonica rice production is
more competitive than early indica
rice production. North wheat and
north corn are produced more
efficiently than south wheat.
China has limited arable land
and an abundant labor force. These
resource endowments give China a
certain comparative advantage in
labor-intensive goods in world
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markets. Labor-intensive crops, such
as vegetables, tobacco, cotton, and
fruits would be better suited for
Chinese agriculture than grains.
Among grain and oilseed crops,
japonica rice has higher comparative
advantage and late indica rice and
north wheat have lower comparative
“disadvantage” over the other crops
in the group. Hence, China’s grain self-
sufficiency policy goes against its
comparative advantage, except for
japonica rice production.
Efficiency gains should result
from the new grain policy that
started in 1999, which pro-
motes high-quality rice and
wheat production and dis-
courages low-quality rice and
wheat production. Over 90
percent of exported rice is
low-quality indica rice and
only about 5 percent is high-
quality japonica, which is
produced mostly in North-
east and North China. Over
the long term, however, the
potential to increase the
high-quality grain production
likely will face increased
water constraints. In the
North China plain, both
agricultural and nonagricul-
tural uses have put high
pressure on available water
resources over the past 20
years, resulting in sharply
cut river flows and reduced
aquifer levels.
The cotton case deserves an
additional qualifier. Since 1996,
China has expanded its production
of cotton and has accumulated
large stocks, which are reflected in
expectations of low world prices.
One can reasonably guess that the
DRC for cotton evaluated at 1999
prices would be greater than one
and that China would be ill advised
to expand its cotton production
further. Assessing this conjecture,
however, requires data not yet
available.
China’s accession to the WTO will
induce the eventual reduction and
elimination of many policies distorting
trade, production, and consumption
of agricultural commodities that are
inconsistent with WTO principles.
Reducing domestic and trade distor-
tions would realign relative costs to
relative world prices; reduce the
production of importables, such as
grains and oilseeds; and promote the
production of exportables, such as
vegetables, fruits, tobacco, and
cotton. Hence, with accession to the
WTO, China’s agricultural trade
patterns would be expected to
increase China’s dependence on world
grain and oilseed markets to satisfy
domestic demand and to absorb its
exportable agricultural production.
China’s current long-term grain self-
sufficiency policy is costly, which
suggests that access to the WTO
would benefit China as well as the
rest of the world.
For more information, see CARD
working paper 99-WP 223,  “Food Self-
Sufficiency, Comparative Advantage,
and Agricultural Trade: A Policy
Analysis Matrix for Chinese Agricul-
ture” by Cheng Fang and John
Beghin, August 1999 (revised version
October 2000). u
TABLE 2. CHINESE AGRICULTURAL
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
             News and information on CARD
         Overviews on current Research
    Information on upcoming events
CARD publications
At
our
website
www.card.iastate.edu
